BĀQER KHAN SĀLĀR-e MELLĪ, one of the popular heroes of the Constitutional Revolution during the defense of Tabrīz in the period of the Lesser Autocracy (estebdād-e ṣaḡīr, Jomādā I, 1326-Rabīʿ II, 1327/June, 1908-July, 1909). Son of Ḥājī Reżā, he was born in Tabrīz in the 1870s and was a bricklayer by profession before emerging as the chief lūṭī of the Ḵīābān quarter, one of the largest in Tabrīz, located in the extreme east of the city and home of some middle rank pro-Constitution ʿolamāʾ. Being himself from an orthodox (motašarreʿ) background but with an inclination to the pro-Constitution Shaikhi leader Ṯeqat al-Eslām, he joined the ranks of the revolutionary militia (mojāhedīn) no later than Rabīʿ I, 1325/May, 1907. During the earliest rounds of clashes between the supporters of the Anjoman-e Ayālatī (provincial assembly) of Tabrīz and their local opponents, he led a small band from his own quarter as a semi-independent force only partially under the control of the Anjoman. Later, like his fellow citizen Sattār Khan Sardār-e Mellī (q.v.) he was recruited into the newly organized police force in an effort to check the urban disturbances and repel the royalist-inspired raids of the Šāhsevan chief Raḥīm Khan Čalabīānlū.
In the following months he rose to some prominence as a result of some internal developments of which the most significant were the increasing insecurity and the threat of the local tribal khans; the final polarization of the city quarters into pro- and anti-Constitution groupings—partly but not wholly on traditional sectarian lines—with the Anjoman representing the Kīābān, Amīrḵīz, and southeastern quarters, and the rival Eslāmīya prevalent in Šotorbān (Devečī), Sorḵāb, and Bāḡmīša (see “La carte de Tauris pendant la révolution,” in E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, London, 1910, pp. 248-49); the further consolidation of the mojāhedīn and the inner struggle for the control of the Anjoman between the Caucasian faction directed by the Markaz-e Ḡaybī (Secret center) and the native faction supported by most merchants and pro-Constitution ʿolamāʾ, with which Kīābān was associated; and finally the difficulties in supplying provisions to the city. These elements provided a suitable climate for the chief lūṭīs like Nāʾeb Bāqer to gain supremacy, as the trouble-ridden Anjoman and the city authorities were dependent on them for maintaining order.
The intensification of the struggle against Moḥammad-ʿAlī Shah and the Constitutionalists’ resistance to the reimposition of the despotic rule turned Bāqer Khan in the eye of the public into a local hero. What added a crucial boost to Bāqer Khan’s popularity was his commitment to the ideals of Mašrūṭa—as he understood them—which was largely lacking among the lūṭīs of the rival quarters. As the tension between Moḥammad-ʿAlī Shah and the Majles reached its apex, the Constitutionalists of Tabrīz dispatched Bāqer Khan, Sattār Khan, and other mojāhedīn to Bāsmenj (12 miles southeast of Tabrīz) to recruit a force of 300 and march to Tehran in defense of the Majles (17 Jomādā I 1326/17 June 1908), but soon the disappointing news from the capital and the impending danger of attacks on Tabrīz made Bāqer Khan return to the barricades of his own quarter and prepare for a defense which lasted ten months. The fighting started immediately in Tabrīz after the fall of the Majles (23 Jomādā I 1326/23 June 1908) when, along with the coup in Tehran, Moḥammad-ʿAlī ordered an assault on the Constitutionalists’ position in the southeastern wing of the city. Bāqer Khan resisted the joint forces of Eslāmīya and Qarajadāḡi horsemen and soon was able to inflict heavy casualties on them. But in less than two weeks the government advances frustrated his hopes, and made him cede to Russian pressure and signal his surrender by hoisting a white flag over his quarter (3 Jomādā II 1326/4 July 1908). However, the stiff resistance and persuasion of Sattār Khan, who reminded Bāqer Khan of their earlier pledge, made him resume the fighting. Bāqer Khan remained overshadowed for the rest of the engagements, however, by the more adventurous Sattār Khan as the core of the resistance was gradually moved to Amīrḵīz. In the months prior to Šaʿbān, 1326/August, 1908, when the reinforced government troops under the command of the newly appointed governor ʿAyn-al-Dawla started a new offensive, the coalition of the two leaders effectively reduced the danger of Eslāmīya, pushed Raḥīm Khan’s forces out of the city, reorganized the mojāhedīn, unified most quarters in their defensive strategy, and defeated the Mākū regiment.
In the next prolonged phase of the conflict (Šaʿbān, 1326-Rabīʿ I, 1327/August, 1908-May, 1909), Bāqer Khan’s skill in street battles was further extended to open-field combat; in the major battle of Sārīdāḡ (29 Ṣafar 1327/22 March 1909), one of the highlights of his career, he led the mojāhedīn forces to capture the positions overlooking Tabrīz and tried, though suffering high casualties, to open the supply routes to the starving city. The outcome of the fighting remained inconclusive, yet resistance led by Bāqer Khan and Sattār Khan exhausted the government troops and forced ʿAyn-al-Dawla to negotiate for lifting the siege. Furthermore, for some months Tabrīz demonstrated the only effective opposition to Moḥammad-ʿAlī Shah and remained a source of encouragement for the formation of other centers of resistance. But the weakening position of the shah made the Russians intervene, and the starvation and shortages gave them the necessary pretext to bring a small contingent into Tabrīz, thus frustrating the short-lived hopes of an imminent victory and forcing Bāqer Khan and Sattār Khan to seek refuge in the Ottoman consulate (8 Rabīʿ II 1327/29 April 1909). Yet despite the Russian’s threatening gestures, Moḥammad-ʿAlī’s position was irredeemable, and soon after his abdication (27 Jomādā II 1327/16 July 1909) Bāqer Khan felt safe enough to return to the scene, though only to encounter a mixed reception.
In the course of the next year, though his personal popularity as the hero of the resistance was hardly ever tarnished by the excesses of his supporters or by his unsuccessful campaign around the province, both the provincial governor Moḵber-al-Salṭana, who showed some anxiety over the alleged disturbances and intervention of the mojāhedīn, and the Russian consul, who became exceedingly apprehensive of the potential danger posed by Bāqer Khan, were critical of his presence. Their combined pressure, blessed with British approval, compelled the central government to arrange for the forced departure of Bāqer Khan and Sattār Khan for Tehran. Though in appearence it was a half-hearted invitation to show gratitude for their efforts to reestablish the Constitution, in reality it was an exile from which they never returned (7 Rabīʿ I 1328/19 March 1910). The effusive welcome at Tehran, ephemeral and ironic as it appears, was still an acknowledgment of their popularity and the role they played in the restoration of the Constitution. But soon the bitter power struggle between the rival Constitutionalist factions made the recently arrived heroes of Tabrīz side with political groupings about whom they knew very little. Bāqer Khan nominally allied himself with the Moderates (eʿtedālīyūn) and tried in vain to secure some place for himself within the exclusive circle of influential statesmen, but soon, following Sattār Khan, he joined with ʿAbd-al-Ḥosayn Khan Moʿezz-al-Solṭān Sardār Moḥyī, a revolutionary leader from Gīlān who shared the same grievances and disappointments with the Tabrīzī leaders. In less than four months, despite widespread support and popularity, Bāqer Khan and his partners become politically isolated. They enjoyed neither the support of the Baḵtīārī-Armenian coalition (under the co-leadership of Sardār Asʿad [q.v.] and Yeprem [q.v.] who both were on good terms with the Democrats) nor that of the Moderates headed by Moḥammad-Walī Khan Sepahdār. The wave of assassinations and feuding quickly culminated in a showdown in Pārk-e Atābak, the residence of Sattār Khan and the center for the mojāhedīn. After a brief resistance Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan had to surrender with humiliation when their supporters who ignored the Majles ultimatum for disarmament were crushed by government troops (30 Rajab 1328/7 August 1910). This was probably a plot sponsored by the Democrats to get rid of the Azerbaijani mojāhedīn and subject their leaders to isolation and despair.
After five years of obscurity in Tehran and living on a government pension, in the summer of the 1915 and on the occasion of Mohājarat (immigration) and the formation of a nationalist government in exile, Bāqer Khan joined the Committee for National Defense and together with remnants of the Tabrīz resistance participated in skirmishes with Russian forces before retreating to Kermānšāh and later to Karkūk and Mosul as the Ottoman forces were withdrawing from western Iran. Though disillusioned and in despair, Bāqer Khan preferred to remain on the Kurdistan border rather than retreat to Turkey. In Moḥarram, 1335/November, 1916, in the confused days just before the British advance in northern Iraq, while wandering in the border villages near Qaṣr-e Šīrīn, he was offered overnight shelter by the Kurdish bandit Moḥammad-Amīn Ṭālebānī who on the same night murdered him and all his party and dumped their bodies nearby.
Bāqer Khan was said to be a bold and short-tempered patriot, a good example of the popular hero with loyalties not only to his own quarter and city, but to the whole of the Constitutional ideals. He was politically unsophisticated, however, and was susceptible to easy manipulation. He hardly ever escaped from what might be called the lūṭī mentality. Time and again he was deceived and ignored because of errors in judgment, when, for instance, he gave in to the persuasions of the Russian agent in Tabrīz or made his plans public in the battle of Sārīdāḡ or miscalculated the Russian military move or underestimated the rival political factions in Tehran. He was typical of those Constitutionalists whose sincere hopes and aspirations were repeatedly frustrated by the vested interests of the dominant groups. Bāqer Khan was helplessly caught up in a complex political situation, yet he emerged as the symbol of a momentary resistance and was acknowledged as such when many other figures of the Constitutional period disappeared in the twilight of the post-Constitutional politics.
SATTĀR KHAN (b. Janali village, Azerbaijan, 1868; d. Tehran, November 9, 1914), later known as “Sardār-e Melli” (The People’s Commander), one of the most popular heroes from Tabriz who defended the town during the Lesser Autocracy (estebdād-e ṣaḡir) in 1908-09 (FIGURE 1). He was the third son of Hīājj Hīasan Bazzāz from Qara-dāḡ. While he was still a child, his eldest brother, who had become a highway robber, was executed by the authorities. The family moved to Tabriz where Sattār himself came into conflict with the law when he tried to find a hideout for two Caucasian fugitives to whom his father had given shelter. He was incarcerated for two years in Narin Qalʿa, a notorious local prison (Amirḵizi, pp. 12-13). Afterwards he too became a brigand and was subsequently imprisoned again. He also served in the gendarmerie controlling the main road between Ḵuy and Marand, and for a while found employment as part of the armed escort (tofangdārān) to the crown prince Moẓaffar-al-Din Mirzā and was given the title of khan (ḵān). After a period in Tehran, he headed an auxiliary troop fighting Turkmen highway robbers near Mashad. Later he returned to Tabriz, and again turned to highway robbery and had to flee the town to escape imprisonment. In 1894-95 he went on a pilgrimage to the holy shrines, ʿAtabāt in Iraq. In Kāẓemayn, Sattār Khan was told of grievances against the guards and janitors at the holy shrine in Samarra and later he himself had a taste of their harsh and insulting behavior towards the Shiʿite pilgrims. In a meeting with the celebrated marjaʿ-e taqlid, Mirza Hīasan-e Širāzi (1815-94), he told this revered religious figure about this appalling situation. Moved by the latter’s visible distress at hearing his account, Sattār Khan assembled a gang of young men and they gave the caretakers a thorough beating. The latter lodged a complaint with the Ottoman authorities but thanks to Mirzā-ye Širāzi’s personal intervention, no action was taken against Sattār Khan and his accomplices (Amirḵizi, pp. 16-18). After a second trip to the ʿAtabāt in 1901-02, when he made a vow at the shrine of Imam ʿAli in Najaf to mend his ways and lead a law-abiding life, he was employed as the manager of an estate in Salmās belonging to Hīājji Moḥammad-Taqi Ṣarrāf, a wealthy landowner from Tabriz. Although Sattār Khan proved energetic at defending the estate against local marauders and thugs, his lack of any formal education proved too great a handicap in matters of accountancy and management and he left in 1903–04 to return to Tabriz where he became a horse dealer (Amirḵizi, pp. 18–19; Ṣafāʾi, pp. 390). He continued to be a luṭi, supporting the people of his district, Amirḵiz, against the arbitrary excesses of the government.
Sattār Khan is reported to have adopted Shaikhi tendencies when he became a follower of Ṯeqat-al-Eslām, the leading Shaikhi cleric of Tabriz and a pro-Constitutionalist. According to Noṣrat-Allāh Fatḥi, Ṯeqat-al-Eslām played a major role as a leading figure during the defense of Tabriz and was Sattār Khan’s main adviser (Fatḥi, pp. 358-61). Luṭis were often used by high-ranking local clerics or notables to secure their political and economic interests. Although generally reputed to be a devout Shiʿite, like most supporters of the Constitutional movement he was accused of being a Bābi by his detractors (Ṣafāʾi, I, p. 393, n. 1).
Sattār Khan was already a well-known figure in Tabriz, particularly in his own quarter of Amirḵiz, before the time of the Lesser Autocracy. But it was during the eleven months of civil war (Jomādā I 1326 - Rabiʿ II 1327/June 1908 – July 1909) that he achieved fame not only in Tabriz, but also in the entire country and beyond. Like many of his contemporaries, he did not fully grasp the significance of a constitution and how it could be implemented. Apparently, as a firm opponent of tyranny and a staunch seeker of justice, he had been waiting for a chance to fight the despotic Qajar government (Ṣafāʾi, I, p. 391; Amirḵizi, pp. 24-26). As a luṭi, he may simply have seized the opportunity to prove his courage and his fighting skills on a larger arena. Having become a member of the Tabrizi mojāhedin (revolutionary militia) in the spring of 1907, and a member of the Constitutionalists’ police force, Sattār Khan also joined the Anjoman-e ḥaqiqat, one of the main organizations of the Tabrizi Constitutionalists (for the role of the anjomans see CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION i. INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND, p. 171). He made his first public appearance when he volunteered to arrest Akrām-al-Salṭana and his men, riflemen of the former crown prince Moḥammad-ʿAli Mirza, who had been sent by the shah to eradicate the Constitutionalists in Tabriz. He was too late, however, since the men had already fled when he and his followers reached their shelter in the gardens outside Tabriz (Kasravi, I, p. 325-29). Later, Sattār Khan set out with his comrade Bāqer Khan for Tehran with 300 men to defend the Parliament (Majles) against Moḥammad-ʿAli Shah and his troops. However, at the same time as the bombardment of the Majles in Tehran on 22 Jomādā I 1326/23 June 1908, civil war broke out in Tabriz between the Constitutionalists and their opponents. Along with their men, Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan had to return at once to Tabriz where they joined in the fighting.
The following eleven months of civil war in Tabriz and the siege of the town by government troops can be divided into three stages: The first stage is characterized by street fighting in the city in late June and early July 1908, when the Mojāhedin succeeded in preventing the royalist forces from gaining control over the city. During the second stage, the royalist forces were stationed in the outskirts of the town and attacked it repeatedly, but to no avail. Beginning in early February 1909, the third stage is marked by the siege of Tabriz, which brought hunger, disease and death. The blockade was brought to an end by Russian military intervention (Afary, pp. 212-13). By then, the central venue of the Constitutionalist cause and its resistance against the shah and his government had moved from Tehran to Tabriz. Owing to the courage and stamina of a large part of the population of Tabriz as well as to the determination of some of its leaders, Sattār Khan among them, the Constitution was “salvaged.” During these three phases of civil war, Sattār Khan emerged as both a local and a national hero. When civil war broke out in Tabriz, Sattār Khan and his men went to protect their quarter, Amirḵiz, against the government troops and the Šāhsevan forces of Raḥim Khan. In contrast to Bāqer Khan who, after nearly two weeks of heavy fighting in the town, hoisted a white flag to signal his surrender, Sattār Khan exhibited much resolution and held his ground. Together with some of his men he went through the town on 17 Jomādā II 1326/17 July 1908 and took down all the white flags hoisted by the people. Had Sattār Khan succumbed to capitulation, the Constitutional cause might have suffered irreparable damage (Amirḵizi, p. 121). As it was, his action encouraged the Constitutionalists in Tabriz and elsewhere in Persia to persevere with the struggle. In recognition of their courage and their military successes, Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan were awarded the honorary titles “Sardār-e melli” and “Sālār-e melli,” respectively, by the Anjoman-e ayālati (the provincial assembly). In the following months, the Mojāhedin prevailed over the anti-Constitutionalist forces in Tabriz and drove the government troops out of town. From there, ʿAyn-al-Dawla’s troops regularly attacked Tabriz and also staged full-scale combat against the Mojāhedin. However, the governor’s attempts at destroying the Mojāhedin’s military and moral cohesion was unsuccesful. Sattār Khan emerged as the military leader of Tabriz and, backed by his advisors Amirḵizi and Ṯeqat-al-Eslām, also played an important role in formulating political decisions. In the accounts presented by Iranian chroniclers, he usually emerges as the main force providing security in Tabriz, and as a man whose manliness (mardānegi), courage and bravery reinvigorated the Constitutional Revolution. He is described as primus inter pares (raʾs-e raʾis) in overall command of all the Mojāhedin from Tabriz as well as their Armenian and Caucasian comrades (Bāmdād, II, p. 60). His fame spread afar when news of the Constitutionalists guided by Sattār Khan along with his picture reached newspaper readers worldwide. On the other hand, some later accounts by European observers depict Sattār Khan as having been spoiled by his success. Apparently, according to one of E. G. Browne’s sources, “He began to rob inoffensive citizens; his house was full of spoils; [...] he took to heavy drinking; he took unto himself many wives; he was no longer seen in the firing rank, but rested on his laurels in slothful ease” (Browne, p. 442).
In the beginning of 1909 the situation in Tabriz deteriorated. In order to break down the resistance of the population through physical hardship and deprivation, ʿAyn-al-Dawla established a blockade. From 13 Moḥarram 1327/4 February 1909, the city was completely cut off from its supply routes. Repeatedly, the Mojāhedin tried to open these routes to provide the starving population with food, but they could not end the blockade. Sattār Khan and his men tried in vain to open the road to Julfa, which was, however, soon entered by Raḥim Khan’s men. Neither military engagements nor diplomatic efforts succeeded in ending the siege. Since Moḥammad-ʿAli Shah did not comply with the British and Russian desire for an armistice in Tabriz, both the British and the Russians agreed to let Russia send troops into Persia to end the siege of Tabriz. When the shah finally ordered an end to the siege in Rabiʿ I 1327/April 1909, Russian troops were already on their way. In the face of the advancing Russian troops, Sattār Khan, Bāqer Khan, and others sought asylum in the Ottoman consulate. Following the shah’s abdication on 27 Jomādā II 1327/16 July 1909, the Mojāhedin felt safe enough to leave the consulate. Sattār Khan was appointed governor of Ardabil and left Tabriz on 23 Šaʿbān 1327/9 September 1909. After only two months he had to give up the struggle against the internal squabbles within the town and Raḥim Khan’s advancing troops, and return to Tabriz. Apparently, he proved to be a drunken and aggressive governor who didn’t know how to control himself (Ṣafāʾi, I, pp. 404-5).
In Tabriz, the newly appointed governor, Moḵber-al-Salṭana, and the Russian consul were eager to rid themselves of the presence of Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan. They and other luṭis had done their duty, their services were no longer needed and, as in the case of Sattār Khan, they seemed incapable of executing governmental functions. Therefore, for fear of further unrest in Tabriz, Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan were sent to Tehran. Even the members of the anjoman-e ayālati indicated that the two men had to leave Tabriz in the interest of the people and that they should not return (Malekzāda, VI, p. 190). On 7 Rabiʿ I 1328/19 March 1910 Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan were escorted out of the town by a large crowd, joined by members of the national militia and a band playing music. Members of parliament greeted them in Qazvin and thousands of people awaited them in Mehrābād, near Tehran. In the capital itself both men received an official welcome by the shah and members of the government at the Golestān palace. For a few days they were the honored guests of the new government before they found their own lodgings. Sattār Khan settled in the Pārk-e Atābak. The competing Constitutionalist factions tried to gain favor with Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan. Soon they were both embroiled in the capital’s political turmoil, a situation that they could neither comprehend nor handle properly. At the same time, the situation in the capital was becoming more and more unstable. This was largely the outcome of the presence of a large number of armed men in the city whom the government could not control. After the assassination of Sayyed ʿAbd-Allāh Behbahāni on 7 Rajab 1328/15 July 1910 and two activists of the Democratic party on 25 Rajab/2 August of the same year, the government and parliament agreed to disarm the Mojāhedin. While Sattār Khan and other leading Mojāhedin figures negotiated the terms of the disarmament with the government, large numbers of discontented Mojāhedin assembled in the Pārk-e Atābak. Although a compromise was found that guaranteed a higher price for the weapons to be collected from the Mojāhedin as well as the integration of Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan into the government forces, and although a number of Persian and foreign envoys tried to mediate, hostilities finally broke out on 1 Šaʿbān 1328/8 August 1910. Sattār Khan and Bāqer Khan sided with the 1,000 strong Mojāhedin forces after the siege of the Park by 1,500 Armenian and Baḵtiāri troops. In the ensuing skirmish Sattār Khan was wounded in the leg. He later pleaded to be allowed to return to Tabriz but this was turned down by the government and he died in Tehran on 28 Ḏu’l-Ḥejja 1332/16 November 1914.
Although in his seminal work, Bandits, Eric Hobsbawm focuses on social bandits in rural societies, some of his findings are applicable to the Iranian luṭigari in its urban context. Bandits, he says, are potential rebels, because they “resist obedience, are outside the range of power, are potential exercisers of power themselves” (Hobsbawm, p. 12). Sometimes, bandits join revolutionary movements when they consider its motives to be just. Then, they demonstrate their trustworthiness by their personal behavior, showing self-sacrifice and devotion to their cause (Hobsbawm, p. 114). As urban social bandits, Iranian luṭis could act both decently and outrageously at the same time. Belonging to the urban poor, these luṭis held on to Shiʿite values and were associated with pre-Islamic Iranian traditions that drew their inspiration from heroic ideals and proclaimed virtues like manliness and heroism (Martin, pp. 126, 113–14). In their combat against the central government, local high-ranking clerics or notables often used luṭis as pawns; and after achieving their aims through their manipulation, they would usually rid themselves of them. Sattār Khan perfectly fits the image of the urban social bandit or luṭi. He defended the rights of Shiʿite pilgrims at the holy sites in Iraq, fought for justice, protected his people in Tabriz during the Constitutional Revolution, and proved to be incapable of leading a respectable life when his particular “luṭi-skills” were no longer needed.
Regarding the chroniclers of the Constitutional Revolution cited here, one has to bear in mind that they have to be regarded as storytellers whose narratives recreate the history of the revolution according to their personal and political viewpoints (Afshari, p. 491); and that they were often inclined to use their accounts of the events to emphasize concepts like Iranian identity and patriotism (Vaziri, p. 160). According to Mohammad-Reza Afshari, the historians of the Constitutional Revolution can be divided into three groups: the populists (like Aḥmad Kasravi) focused on the common people and glorified the Mojāhedin in Tabriz; the elitists (among them Fereydun Ādamiyat and Ebrāhim Ṣafāʾi) concentrated on reformers and demystified popular heroes; the traditionalists (among them Nāẓem-al-Eslām Kermāni and Mehdi Šarif Kāšāni) sympathized with the leading pro-constitutional Mojtaheds (Afshari, pp. 477–94). In spite of their differing accounts, it is largely thanks to these chroniclers and intellectuals that Sattār Khan’s memory has survived. Amirḵizi gives a long list of, as he calls it, of “Sattār Khan’s commendable qualities and praiseworthy traits” (ṣefāt-e pasandida va ḵaṣāyel-e setuda-ye Sattār Khan). Likewise approving were Kasravi and Malekzāda, who witnessed Sattār Khan’s appearance in Tabriz during the revolution, and created their myth of the brave hero “with unshakeable beliefs and purity of heart” in their writings (Kasravi, I, p. 328; Malekzāda, V, p. 17). Others, among them the well-known and more recent historian Fereydun Ādamiyat, are more critical of the man, describing him simply as a highway robber called “Sattār Khan” (Ādamiyat, p. 132).
It is, therefore, extremely difficult to establish an unbiased image of men like Sattār Khan about whom little is known from other sources. Fortunately, however, the Persian as well as English sources differ in their portrayal of a personality whose merits seem to be undisputable but whose character defects have equally to be taken into account. Nevertheless, Sattār Khan gives a face to the Constitutional Revolution and even represents it, at least after the coup d’état of 1908. He presents himself as an example of a mythical personage, and as a long-lasting focal point of collective memory and identity, whose symbolic function has an impact until this very day. Perceived as a local hero in Azerbaijan, he is still remembered as one of the champions of the Constitutional Revolution throughout Iran.